| 01 |
A Garden of Hackenbush Stalks
Three Blue-Red Hackenbush stalks stand side by side. Find the value of the whole position as a fraction.
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Game Theory |
7.0/10
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Unsolved
|
| 02 |
A Helpful Vote That Hurts
Under instant-runoff voting, how few ballots must change to hand the win to the candidate currently eliminated first?
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Game Theory |
7.0/10
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Unsolved
|
| 03 |
A Ladder with Steps 1, 3 and 4
A pile, three allowed removal sizes, and a thousand starting sizes to test. For how many does the second player win?
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Game Theory |
6.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 04 |
A Prize Worth Ten and Six
Two bidders with known, unequal valuations run an all-pay auction in mixed strategies. What does the seller expect to collect?
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Game Theory |
6.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 05 |
A Row of Coins and a Ruler
Sixteen coins in a row, five showing heads. A move flips a block of consecutive coins ending in a head. How many opening moves win?
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Game Theory |
9.0/10
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Unsolved
|
| 06 |
A Seat Worth a Twelfth
Four shareholders vote by weight, and 51 wins. The smallest holder is far from powerless. How much power does the Shapley-Shubik index assign?
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Game Theory |
6.0/10
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Unsolved
|
| 07 |
A Shrinking Pie in Six Rounds
Two players haggle over a pile of coins that loses 15 coins each time an offer is rejected, and the game ends after six rounds. What does the first proposer keep?
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Game Theory |
7.0/10
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Unsolved
|
| 08 |
A Three-by-Three Value
A zero-sum 3×3 matrix with no saddle point and no dominated strategy. Find what the row player can guarantee on average.
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Game Theory |
6.0/10
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Unsolved
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| 09 |
A Truel with Better Aim
Three shooters take turns firing, and any of them may deliberately miss. With these accuracies, what are the first shooter's chances of being the last one standing?
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Game Theory |
8.0/10
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Unsolved
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| 10 |
A Unique Mixed Equilibrium
A 3×3 non-zero-sum game with no pure equilibrium. Its single Nash equilibrium uses every strategy of both players.
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Game Theory |
7.0/10
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Unsolved
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| 11 |
Asymmetric War of Attrition
Two firms wait out a standoff over a prize. In the mixed equilibrium, the firm that values the prize less ends up winning more often.
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Game Theory |
7.0/10
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Unsolved
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| 12 |
Bargaining with Costly Delay
Two bargainers alternate offers over a dollar, but each round of waiting costs each of them a fixed amount rather than a fraction. Who benefits from being cheaper to wait?
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Game Theory |
7.0/10
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Unsolved
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| 13 |
Bargaining with Unequal Patience
Two players alternate offers over one dollar, and each round of delay shrinks the value of money differently for each of them. What share does the first proposer get?
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Game Theory |
6.0/10
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Unsolved
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| 14 |
Battle of the Sexes
A couple prefers being together but disagrees on the venue. In the mixed equilibrium, how often does each attend their own favorite?
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Game Theory |
4.0/10
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Unsolved
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| 15 |
Bertrand Competition
Two identical firms set prices and the cheaper one takes the whole market. Where do prices end up?
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Game Theory |
3.0/10
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Unsolved
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| 16 |
Blotto with an Edge
Colonel Blotto on three battlefields with 5 soldiers against 4. How much of an edge does the extra soldier really give?
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Game Theory |
7.0/10
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Unsolved
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| 17 |
Chomp
Players eat chunks of a chocolate bar whose bottom-left square is poisoned. Who wins with optimal play, and why is the proof famous?
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Game Theory |
7.0/10
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Unsolved
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| 18 |
Chomp on a Four-by-Seven Bar
On a 4×7 Chomp bar exactly one opening bite wins. After it, how many squares of chocolate are left?
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Game Theory |
8.0/10
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Unsolved
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| 19 |
Chomp on the Divisors of 360
Players name divisors of 360, deleting every multiple of the name. Naming 1 loses. What is the first player's only winning move?
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Game Theory |
9.0/10
|
Unsolved
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| 20 |
Counting Agendas That Elect Alpha
A chair can choose any of the 24 orders in which four proposals are voted on, against sophisticated voters. How many of those orders hand the win to Alpha?
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Game Theory |
8.0/10
|
Unsolved
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| 21 |
Counting Losing Coin Rows
Sixteen coins, each heads or tails, and a game of flipping short blocks. For how many of the 65536 arrangements does the second player win?
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Game Theory |
9.0/10
|
Unsolved
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| 22 |
Counting Swings in a Committee
A weighted committee of five, quota 8. Count how often each member can flip the outcome, then normalise. What share does the 4-vote member hold?
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Game Theory |
6.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 23 |
Counting the Winning Nim Moves
In a four-pile game of Nim the first player is winning. How many different first moves keep that win?
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Game Theory |
7.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 24 |
Cournot Duopoly
Two firms simultaneously choose quantities with price P = 120 − Q and zero costs. What does each produce in equilibrium?
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Game Theory |
3.0/10
|
Unsolved
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| 25 |
Cram on a Four-by-Four Board
Two players place dominoes on a 4×4 board, covering two adjacent squares each time. The player who cannot place loses. Who wins?
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Game Theory |
5.0/10
|
Unsolved
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| 26 |
Cutting the Cake with Inside Information
A cutter who knows the chooser's tastes can do better than half. How much of the cake, by the cutter's own measure, can they secure?
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Game Theory |
7.0/10
|
Unsolved
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| 27 |
Dominated by a Mixture
No pure strategy is dominated by another pure strategy, yet iterated elimination still singles out one outcome.
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Game Theory |
6.0/10
|
Unsolved
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| 28 |
Education as a Pooling Signal
Employers cannot see ability, only schooling. How much schooling can both types be pushed into when everyone chooses the same level and wages follow the average?
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Game Theory |
7.0/10
|
Unsolved
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| 29 |
Exits from a Wythoff Position
In Wythoff's game with piles of 15 and 23, how many different first moves hand the opponent a lost position?
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Game Theory |
6.0/10
|
Unsolved
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| 30 |
Fibonacci Nim
A pile of 76 stones, a cap on each move that depends on the opponent's last move. What is the only winning first move?
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Game Theory |
6.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 31 |
First-Price Auction with Uniform Values
Two bidders with uniform private values bid in a first-price auction. What fraction of their value does each bid in equilibrium?
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Game Theory |
5.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 32 |
Five Couples, Five Matchings
Five men and five women rank each other. A matching is stable if no pair would both rather elope. How many stable matchings does this instance have?
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Game Theory |
7.0/10
|
Unsolved
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| 33 |
Four Strategies Each, Two Needed
A 4×4 zero-sum game that looks like a linear program but collapses to a 2×2 after a few strict dominance deletions.
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Game Theory |
6.0/10
|
Unsolved
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| 34 |
Grim Trigger
In an infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, how patient must players be for grim-trigger cooperation to hold?
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Game Theory |
3.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 35 |
Hawk-Dove
Hawks fight over a resource at a cost; Doves share and flee. With what probability is Hawk played in the evolutionarily stable strategy?
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Game Theory |
6.0/10
|
Unsolved
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| 36 |
How Many Firms Enter
Firms enter a Cournot market until profit no longer covers a fixed cost. Because firms come in whole numbers, the exact count takes a little care.
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Game Theory |
5.0/10
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Unsolved
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| 37 |
Leader and Two Followers
One firm commits to a quantity first; two rivals then play Cournot against each other. How much does the leader earn?
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Game Theory |
6.0/10
|
Unsolved
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| 38 |
Left Gloves and Right Gloves
Players hold single gloves, and only matching pairs are worth anything. What does the Shapley value say a right-glove owner deserves?
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Game Theory |
6.9/10
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Unsolved
|
| 39 |
Level Three in a Three-Player Beauty Contest
In a small beauty contest your own guess counts toward the average. Chase the chain of best replies three steps from a naive 50.
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Game Theory |
4.0/10
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Unsolved
|
| 40 |
Losing Nim Triples
Three Nim piles, each between 1 and 15 stones. How many of the 3375 starting positions are lost for the first player?
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Game Theory |
7.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 41 |
Loyal Customers and Shoppers
Two firms with zero cost split loyal buyers but fight over price-comparing shoppers. In the mixed equilibrium, how likely is a deep discount?
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Game Theory |
6.0/10
|
Unsolved
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| 42 |
Maker and Breaker on a Grid
Maker wants an entire row or column of a 4×4 grid. Breaker wants to stop that. With Maker moving first, who wins?
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Game Theory |
4.0/10
|
Unsolved
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| 43 |
Making the Other Side Indifferent
A 2×2 game with no pure equilibrium. Row's equilibrium payoff is pinned down by what Column is willing to randomize over.
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Game Theory |
6.0/10
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Unsolved
|
| 44 |
Matching Pennies
Match pennies: Player 1 wins $1 on a match, Player 2 wins $1 on a mismatch. What is the value of this game?
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Game Theory |
5.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 45 |
Misère Tic-Tac-Toe Openings
In tic-tac-toe where completing three in a row loses, most opening squares lose against perfect play. How many?
|
Game Theory |
7.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 46 |
Nim 3-4-5
Nim with piles of 3, 4, and 5: the first player wins with optimal play. How many stones does the unique winning first move remove?
|
Game Theory |
6.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 47 |
Nim Where You May Split a Pile
Four piles; a move either takes stones from one pile or cuts a pile into two smaller ones. Exactly one first move wins: how many stones does it remove?
|
Game Theory |
7.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 48 |
Nim with Two Piles at Once
Nim, except a move may reduce one pile or two piles at the same time. Piles 5, 8, 11, 13: how many stones remain after the only winning move?
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Game Theory |
7.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 49 |
Nobody Wants Three in a Row
Both players write X on a 3×3 grid, and whoever completes three in a row loses. Which opening square wins?
|
Game Theory |
5.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 50 |
Peeling Away Dominated Strategies
Only one player has a dominated strategy at the start, yet repeated rounds of elimination pin down a single outcome of this 3×3 game.
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Game Theory |
6.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 51 |
Penney's Game
Two players pick sequences of three coin flips. The player whose sequence appears first wins. How many distinct sequences can Player 2 choose to guarantee a winning edge over any sequence Player 1 picks?
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Game Theory |
3.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 52 |
Placing Mutually Safe Queens
Players take turns putting a queen on a 7×7 board so that no two queens attack each other. Who wins?
|
Game Theory |
5.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 53 |
Prime Powers and Multiples of Six
A pile, and each turn you remove a prime power or exactly one stone. How many starting sizes up to 1000 lose for the mover?
|
Game Theory |
6.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 54 |
Race to 100
Players alternately add 1–10 to a running total; whoever says exactly 100 wins. What is the winning first move?
|
Game Theory |
3.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 55 |
Removing Powers of Two
Heaps of 14, 20 and 29. From a heap you may take 1, 2, 4, 8, ... stones. How many opening moves win?
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Game Theory |
8.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 56 |
Rock-Paper-Scissors with Stakes
Rock-paper-scissors where each winning hand pays a different amount. How often should you throw rock?
|
Game Theory |
7.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 57 |
Selling Imperfect Substitutes
Two firms set prices for products that are close, but not perfect, substitutes. What price do they settle on?
|
Game Theory |
5.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 58 |
Solve the Matrix
A zero-sum game with payoff matrix [[3, −1], [−2, 4]]. What is the value of the game?
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Game Theory |
5.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 59 |
Sophisticated Voting on an Agenda
Five voters decide among four proposals in a fixed sequence of pairwise votes, and everyone sees where each vote leads. Which proposal survives?
|
Game Theory |
7.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 60 |
St. Petersburg Paradox
A casino flips a coin repeatedly. You win 2^n dollars where n is the flip on which heads first appears. What is the expected value of this game?
|
Game Theory |
6.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 61 |
Stackelberg Leadership
Same market as Cournot, but one firm commits to its quantity first. What does the leader produce?
|
Game Theory |
5.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 62 |
Stag Hunt
Hunt the stag together for the big payoff, or play it safe with a hare? Find the mixed-equilibrium probability of hunting stag.
|
Game Theory |
4.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 63 |
Take Away a Perfect Square
On each turn you remove 1, 4, 9, 16, ... stones. Among piles of size 1 to 100, how many are lost for the player to move?
|
Game Theory |
5.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 64 |
The Centipede Game
Two players could grow a pot over 100 rounds by passing. On which round does backward induction say the game ends?
|
Game Theory |
7.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 65 |
The Chain Store's Twenty Markets
A chain store faces twenty would-be entrants, one per town, and fighting looks like a good way to scare off the rest. Does rational play agree? Compute its total profit.
|
Game Theory |
9.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 66 |
The Chance of a Voting Cycle
Three voters rank three candidates at random. How likely is it that majority preference chases its own tail?
|
Game Theory |
6.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 67 |
The Firm That Stays Out
Two Cournot firms face a demand curve, but one has costs so high that the usual formulas go wrong. What does the other earn?
|
Game Theory |
3.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 68 |
The Gap Between the Top Two
In a second-price auction, the winner keeps the gap between the two highest values. How big is that gap on average with three bidders?
|
Game Theory |
5.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 69 |
The Limits of the Core
Three players can share a total of 100, but pairs can walk away with their own sums. What is the most the middle player can claim without anyone defecting?
|
Game Theory |
5.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 70 |
The Optimal Seller
Two bidders have exponentially distributed values. A seller who chooses the best possible auction and reserve earns how much in expectation?
|
Game Theory |
7.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 71 |
The Outside Option Threat
One bargainer can walk away to a sure outside payoff, but only at certain moments. Does the threat to walk change what the first proposer gets?
|
Game Theory |
10.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 72 |
The Pirate Gold Problem
Five perfectly rational pirates divide 100 gold coins. The most senior proposes a split; a strict majority rejection means he dies. How many coins does the senior pirate keep?
|
Game Theory |
6.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 73 |
The Plurality Winner Loses the Count
A candidate leads in first-place votes, yet a different one wins when every ranking is scored. Who takes the Borda count?
|
Game Theory |
5.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 74 |
The Poisoned Corner King
A king walks toward the corner of a chessboard, but whoever steps onto the corner loses. On how many squares does the player to move lose?
|
Game Theory |
7.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 75 |
The Prisoner's Dilemma
Two suspects are interrogated separately with the classic payoffs. How many years does each serve in the unique Nash equilibrium?
|
Game Theory |
3.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 76 |
The Rational Ultimatum
A proposer splits $100; the responder can accept or leave both with nothing. What does a purely rational proposer offer?
|
Game Theory |
6.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 77 |
The Reserve That Reshapes Bids
A reserve price in a first-price auction shifts every bid upward, even for bidders far above it. How much does the top type bid?
|
Game Theory |
5.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 78 |
The Second-Price Auction
The highest bidder wins but pays the second-highest bid. What is the optimal bid, no matter what anyone else does?
|
Game Theory |
5.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 79 |
The Truel
Three shooters with hit rates 1/3, 2/3, and 1 duel in turns, weakest first. What should the weakest shooter do first?
|
Game Theory |
4.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 80 |
The Unprofitable Merger
Two of three identical Cournot firms merge. By how much does their combined profit change?
|
Game Theory |
5.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 81 |
The Volunteer's Dilemma
Three bystanders each wish someone would act. In the symmetric mixed equilibrium, how often does exactly the right number volunteer?
|
Game Theory |
7.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 82 |
The Wandering Token
A token walks over a 3×3 grid of squares and may never revisit a square. From how many starting squares does the first mover win?
|
Game Theory |
5.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 83 |
Three Bidders, All Pay
In an all-pay auction everyone pays, win or lose. With three bidders, how much should a bidder with value 3/4 put in?
|
Game Theory |
5.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 84 |
Three Heaps, Three Subtractions
Heaps of 38, 53 and 71, but you may only remove 2, 5 or 6 stones at a time. Count the first moves that preserve the win.
|
Game Theory |
7.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 85 |
To Deter or Not to Deter
An incumbent can build capacity before a rival decides whether to pay a fixed cost to enter. Is flooding the market to keep the rival out actually worth it?
|
Game Theory |
9.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 86 |
Traveler's Dilemma
Two travelers claim a value from $2 to $100 for lost luggage, with a $2 bonus for the lower claim. What do rational players claim?
|
Game Theory |
5.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 87 |
Two-Thirds of the Average
Everyone picks a number in [0, 100]; closest to two-thirds of the average wins. What do perfectly rational players pick?
|
Game Theory |
5.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 88 |
Values That Lean High
Two bidders draw private values from a distribution tilted toward high numbers. What is the expected revenue of a first-price auction?
|
Game Theory |
4.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 89 |
Weak-Link Effort Game
Two partners choose effort levels, but output depends only on the lower one. Count the pure-strategy equilibria.
|
Game Theory |
3.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 90 |
Who Ends Up with Z
Run the men-proposing deferred acceptance procedure on four men and four women. Which man is left holding Z at the end?
|
Game Theory |
6.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 91 |
Who Pays for the Bridge
Three citizens report how much a bridge is worth to them, and the Clarke pivot rule charges each for the harm they cause others. What is the total collected?
|
Game Theory |
8.0/10
|
Unsolved
|
| 92 |
Wythoff's Losing Pairs up to Fifty
How many starting positions in Wythoff's game, with both piles between 1 and 50, are lost for the player to move?
|
Game Theory |
5.0/10
|
Unsolved
|